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A B S T R A C T
There is a renewed interest in expanding domestic oil and gas development in the United Kingdom (UK).
However, the potential social consequences of this expansion are still unknown. Thus, the current study assesses
whether the number of spudded oil and gas wells are correlated with violent and property crime rates within 69
local authorities between 2004 and 2015 (n=828). Fixed eﬀects regression analyses indicate that wells are
positively correlated with violent crime rates. That is, each additional well is associated with a 1.5% increase in
violent crime. When the analysis is limited to those local authorities that have constructed the most wells, the
correlation between wells and crime increases as the boomtown literature might suggest. In particular, each
additional well is associated with a 4.9% increase in violent crime and a 4.9% increase in property crime. We
conclude by pointing out that this study stands as the ﬁrst to empirically examine the relationship between oil
and gas development and crime within UK local authorities over time and suggest that results have important
implications for crime, social disorganisation and environmental justice.
1. Introduction
Global energy demands and a call to increase unconventional forms
of natural gas extraction have led to a renewed interest in the re-
lationship between oil and gas development and crime (Hultman et al.,
2011). The present study responds to this interest by examining the
relationship between oil and gas development and crime rates within
UK local authorities between 2004 and 2015. The relationship between
oil and gas development and crime in the UK is interesting for three
reasons. First, UK policy-makers and industry are promoting the swift
expansion of domestic natural gas development. For example, in Jan-
uary 2014 the UK’s then Prime Minister David Cameron stressed gas
extraction as one aspect of the government’s new energy policy, noting,
‘we’re going all out for shale. It will mean more jobs and opportunities
for people and economic security for our country’ (Watt, 2014, 1). As
oil and gas expansion is set to expand in the UK additional information
about the potential consequences of oil and gas development on crime
are warranted. Second, while a handful of studies have examined the
relationship between natural gas extraction and crime in the US, there
have been no studies of this potential relationship in the UK and it is
unclear whether US ﬁndings can be extended to the UK (Hays et al.,
2015). Therefore, additional studies of the relationship between oil and
gas development and crime are needed in the UK for extension and
comparison. Third, the present study can provide additional theoretical
insight into the potentially disruptive consequences of extractive forms
of development by examining crime as an outcome. This focus can be
linked to contemporary environmental justice issues and debates
(Freudenburg and Gramling, 1992).
Our analysis of oil and gas development and crime is divided into
four sections. First, we draw upon the concept of boomtowns and social
disorganization to explain why oil and gas development might be re-
lated to crime. We then provide a summary of the existing empirical
studies that examine the relationship between oil and gas development
and crime. Second, we describe the key variables used to examine the
correlation between oil and gas development and crime. Third, we
explain how we use these key variables to examine crime rates within
local authorities in the UK. Finally, we draw some conclusions about
the role of oil and gas development on crime rates and explore some
potential implications of these ﬁndings for the political economy of
crime and environmental justice studies.
2. Theoretical perspective & previous empirical studies
There is a common belief that oil and gas development can
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2018.03.006
Received 25 December 2017; Received in revised form 4 March 2018; Accepted 4 March 2018
☆ This research has been supported by a grant from the British Academy (SG151310).
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: paul.stretesky@northumbria.ac.uk (P.B. Stretesky), michael.long@okstate.edu (M.A. Long), ruth.mckie@dmu.ac.uk (R.E. McKie),
feizel.aryee@northumbria.ac.uk (F.A. Aryee).
The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
2214-790X/ © 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/).
Please cite this article as: Stretesky, P.B., The Extractive Industries and Society (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2018.03.006
disorganise communities by causing the rapid congregation of people
and money (O’Connor, 2015, 2017). The term ‘boomtown’ is histori-
cally used to describe natural resource development and its connection
to crime. Nearly one hundred years ago historian Hagedorn (1921, 48)
described Little Missouri (USA) as a ‘boomtown’ and ‘villainous
gateway to the bad lands [and full of] outcasts of society, reckless,
greedy, and conscienceless; fugitives from justice with criminal records,
and gunmen who lived by crooked gambling and thievery of every sort.’
In the UK the term is also synonymous with the kind of social disorder
that is perpetuated by rapid population growth (Brooks and Haworth,
1993; Calnan, 2011).
The notion of social disorganisation often associated with boom-
towns can be traced back to Durkheim ([1893]1893). As communities
change with the introduction of development, mechanical solidarity
declines and leads to greater variation in community norms that facil-
itate higher rates of community problems such as suicide and crime
(Durkheim [1893] 1984). Over time, Durkheim suggests that develop-
ment can prevent social problems if institutions are correctly func-
tioning and as mechanical solidarity gives way to organic solidarity in a
move that strengthens regulative and integrative social forces (see also
Shelley, 1981).
Despite the general modernization idea that development can lead
to reductions in crime over time, most studies of community crime and
oil and gas development tend to focus on the short term and negative
aspects of development. Researchers such as Freudenburg (1979, 1984,
1992) have observed that oil and gas development can produce
boomtown like conditions that sow the seeds for immediate increases in
crime (Wilkinson et al., 1982). Researchers who examine oil and gas
development on crime also suggest it is ‘inherently disruptive’ for
communities. For instance, Luthra (2006) and Seydlitz et al. (1993)
observe that social disorganisation associated with oil and gas devel-
opment may be the mechanism that explains the relationship between
extraction and crime. These observations about social disorganization
acting as a mechanism in explaining crime are situated in Shaw and
McKay’s (1969) work in Chicago (USA). Shaw and McKay point out that
rapidly changing populations will disrupt patterns of relationships
within communities and create the kind of social milieu and community
conﬂict that is ripe for crime and deviance (Shaw and Mckay, 1969).
They note that social institutions are less eﬀective within zones of
transition because people know a smaller proportion of community
residents and therefore have fewer social bonds that prevent crime
(Shaw and McKay, 1969; see also Freudenburg, 1979). Social isolation
may increase in areas where oil and gas development occurs because
people have less contact with those people they do know, weakening
social ties among residents (Freudenburg, 1979). Together, fewer bonds
and weaker ties may create the social conditions for crime. Because of
the decrease in the density of acquaintances, communities that are in
transition must increasingly rely on formal social controls such as law
enforcement to prevent unwanted behaviour (Clinard and Meier, 1975;
Ruddell, 2011). This type of social control may lead to additional
weakening of community bonds and can result in even more crime.
These ideas about social disorganisation provide the theoretical
grounding for most studies of oil and gas development and crime.
A handful of empirical studies have examined whether oil and gas
development is correlated with crime. These studies can be classiﬁed
according to their results. The ﬁrst set of studies ﬁnd evidence of a
correlation between oil and gas extraction and crime. For example,
Seydlitz et al. (1993) examined the impact of oﬀshore oil and gas de-
velopment on community crime rates. The researchers examine the
impacts of oﬀshore oil extraction wells in communities surrounding the
Gulf of Mexico by looking at the price of oil and the number of wells
drilled in Louisiana parishes between 1956 and 1981. They ﬁnd that
homicide rates were higher in those parishes with the most wells. This
positive correlation between oil development and crime was more in-
tense in those parishes where a greater percentage of residents were
employed in the oil industry and therefore receiving higher oil and gas
wages. Consistent with social disorganization theory, the researchers
also ﬁnd that homicide rates were highest during those periods of rapid
oil and gas development (Seydlitz et al., 1993, 1999).
Ruddell and Ortiz (2014) recently examined property and violent
crime in oil and gas producing counties in Montana and North Dakota.
The researchers compared (1) property and violent crime rates in 26 oil
producing counties to crime rates in a matched sample of 26 non-pro-
ducing counties and (2) property and violent crime pre- and post- ‘gas
booms’ in all counties. The researchers discovered no statistically sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences in crime rates when comparing across communities
by level of development. They did, however, discover a sharp increase
in crime over time in oil producing counties. Speciﬁcally, both violent
and property crime increased in oil producing counties between the
years of 2006 and 2012. For violent crime, the increase was 19% and
for property crime, the increase was 12%. In contrast, property crime
decreased by 22% and violent crime decreased by 26% in non-produ-
cing counties pre- boom (2006–2008). Interestingly, the only demo-
graphic diﬀerence between counties was population change during the
boom years (2008–2012). The population in non-producing counties
increased by 0.13%, while the population of oil producing counties
increased by 1.85%. The overall population, percentage of males and
per capital income did not diﬀer between counties.
Recently, Price et al. (2014) examined the relationship between the
number of oil and gas wells and property and violent crime rates in 210
counties in Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia (US). While the study
found little evidence that increased oil and gas extraction related de-
velopment led to population growth in a boomtown fashion, there was,
nevertheless, a 17.7% increase in violent and 10.8% increase in prop-
erty crime in high drilling counties between the years of 2005 and
2012.
A second set of empirical studies ﬁnds mixed evidence that oil and
gas development leads to higher levels of crime. For instance, Covey
and Menard (1983) conducted one of the ﬁrst longitudinal studies of
crime rates in Colorado (US) during the 1970s and compare the change
in crime rates between counties with and without oil and gas devel-
opment over time. The researchers found that between 1970 and 1979
crime increased more substantially in oil and gas development counties
than those without development. Covey and Menard’s results persist
even after controlling for population changes. However, the results
were not consistent for all types of crime as Covey and Menard found
that oil and gas development was associated with a decrease in homi-
cide rates.
Komarek (2015) also recently examined the potential impact of
unconventional gas extraction (or fracking) in Pennsylvania (US)
counties in the Utica and Marcellus shale formations between the years
of 2004 and 2012 and discovered that the number of unconventional
wells drilled is positively correlated with violent crime (i.e., murder,
rape, robbery and assault). Importantly, Komarek (2015) discovered
that high-development counties (i.e., those that had more than 75
wells) had violent crime increases that were 30% higher than low-
fracking counties. Importantly, the number of fracking wells was re-
lated to violent crime in both high- and low-fracking counties between
the years of 2004 and 2012. Despite the rather strong correlations be-
tween violent crime and fracking wells, Komarek (2015, 31) found that
property crime was uncorrelated with the number of fracking wells.
Finally, James and Smith (2017) examined the relationship between
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geographical shale formations and crime rates in US counties between
2000 and 2011. When comparing shale ‘plays’ (n= 378) and ‘booming
plays’ (n= 215) to non-shale counties the researchers determined there
is a robust correlation between petroleum development and crime.
Moreover, the ‘booming’ play counties had greater increases in crime
than the play counties, suggesting that those communities with more
rapid levels of development also experienced higher crime rates than
those communities with lower levels of development. Rather than
looking at aggregate crime types, James and Smith examined rates for
speciﬁc types of crime as reported by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (i.e., murder, rape, robbery, assault, larceny, burglary and motor
vehicle theft). The researchers report that violent crime rates are more
likely than property crime rates to surge during the energy booms.
These violent crime increases appear to be independent of social and
economic changes in variables such as gross domestic product, mining
employment, population size, percentage male, and percentage of the
population that is young.
A third set of studies fail to ﬁnd any positive correlation between oil
and gas development and crime. Wilkinson et al. (1984) examine the
relationship between violent crime and oil and gas development in
nonmetropolitan counties between 1970 and 1978 in energy producing
states in the US (i.e., Arizona, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Utah
and Wyoming). The results of their analysis produced no evidence that
oil and gas development are associated with crime. The researchers
concluded that there is little support for the position that crime is
caused by social disorganization and instead suggest that longstanding
structural diﬀerences such as low levels of unemployment and high
rates of poverty distinguish between crime rates among communities.
Luthra et al., 2007; see also Luthra, 2006) also examined the relation-
ship between oﬀshore oil and gas development and crime rates between
1974 and 2004 in twelve Louisiana parishes where a signiﬁcant number
of residents were employed in oil and gas development. These oil and
gas parishes were then compared to 24 similar parishes where no oil
and gas development existed. Contrary to expectations, Luthra et al.
(2007, 121) found that ‘as oil activity increases over time and across
parishes, the levels of homicide and aggravated assault signiﬁcantly
declines [and that] oil activity is not signiﬁcantly associated with any of
the other crime oﬀences.’ As a result, the researchers claim that oil and
gas development does not lead to community conditions or the type of
social disorganisation that produces increases in crime but may, in-
stead, be beneﬁcial to communities.
In total, existing studies that examine the relationship between oil
and gas development and crime lead to diﬀerent conclusions. That is,
one set of studies ﬁnds a consistent relationship between oil and gas
development and all types of crime; a second set of studies ﬁnds a re-
lationship between oil and gas development and violent crime (except
homicide); a third set of studies ﬁnds little evidence of a positive re-
lationship between oil and gas development and crime. Unfortunately,
nearly all quantitative studies focused exclusively on the relationship
between oil and gas development and crime rates are based in the US.
Due to the diversity of ﬁndings and the lack of research within the UK,
additional analysis is warranted.
3. Methodology
We study the correlation between natural gas development and
crime within local authorities in the UK between 2004 and 2015. As
Fig. 1 illustrates, there were a total of 300 new oil and gas wells de-
veloped in the UK between the years of 2004 and 2015. Oil and gas
development increases considerably between 2004 (n=18) and 2008
(n=45), at which point the number of newly established wells decline
until 2015 (n= 7). To conduct our analysis, we assembled panel data
for crime rates, the number of natural gas wells, and control variables
for 69 local authorities located in England, Scotland and Wales (listed
in Appendix A).
We chose to study these 69 local authorities since they are the
communities where oil and gas development takes place and because
local authorities inﬂuence development decisions. In total, we collected
12 years of data for each local authority. We pooled the observations for
the 69 local authorities so that the data set consists of 828 community-
year observations. Crime data are not available every year for every
local authority, consequently, the number of community-crime years
varies from 734 (for violence) to 777 (for violent crime, property crime
and homicide). All variables used in our statistical analysis are de-
scribed below with descriptive statistics for the overall sample pre-
sented in Appendix B. We now turn to the description of the variables
used in our models.
3.1. Dependent variables
There are four diﬀerent dependent variables in this study: homicide
rates (Homicide), violent crime rates (Violent Crime), violence rates
(Violence) and property crime rates (Property Crime). All crime rates are
measured as the number of oﬀences per 100,000 residents in any given
year and are transformed using the natural logarithm to produce better
ﬁtting models and adjust for non-linear relationships. Data on crime
come from diﬀerent sources depending on the country. In England and
Wales crime data come from the Recorded Crime Data at Community
Safety Partnership/Local Authority Level data ﬁles obtained from the
Oﬃce of National Statistics (https://www.ons.gov.uk). In England and
Wales the homicide rate is calculated by computing the number of
homicides per 100,000 residents; the violent crime rate is calculated by
combining the total number ‘homicide’, ‘robbery’, ‘sexual oﬀences’,
‘violence with injury’ and ‘violence without injury’, dividing by the
resident population of the local authority and multiplying by 100,000;
the violence rate is calculated by dividing the sum of crimes of violence
with and without injury and dividing by the population; and the
property crime rate is calculated by combining ‘domestic burglary’,
‘non-domestic burglary’, ‘shoplifting,’ ‘theft from the person’ and ‘all
other theft oﬀences,’ dividing by the resident population local authority
and multiplying by 100,000. In Scotland, crime data come from the
Scottish Government’s Recorded Crime in Scotland datasets (http://
www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse). In Scotland, the homicide
rate is calculated by computing the number of homicides per 100,000
residents in local authorities. The violent crime rate in Scotland’s local
authorities is computed in the same way as for England and Wales.’ The
Fig. 1. Number of Spudded Oil and Gas Wells, 2004–2015.
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property crime rate in Scotland’s local authorities is determined by
combining ‘housebreaking,’ ‘theft by opening a lockfast place,’ ‘theft
from a motor vehicle,’ ‘theft of a motor vehicle’ and ‘shoplifting and
other theft.’
One potential problem with diﬀerent sources of crime data is the
inability to make comparisons across local authorities. That is, diﬀer-
ences in crime rates between local authorities in diﬀerent countries in
the UK could simply be the result of administrative diﬀerences in the
coding and classifying of crime data (McCleary et al., 1982; see also
Soothill and Francis, 2012). While deﬁnitions of crime may vary across
England, Wales and Scotland, there are ways to minimize the problem
of inconsistency in statistical analysis of crime data. For example,
variations across local authorities are not likely to be problematic when
examining the correlates of crime within local authorities. This within
eﬀects approach is the one we take to help solve the problems of in-
consistent measurements across local authorities. The use of ﬁxed ef-
fects panel regression follows our theoretical test of the relationship
between oil and gas development and crime where we are interested in
changes within, rather than between, local authorities. The ﬁxed eﬀects
approach minimises problems associated with the diﬀerent categor-
isations of violent and property crime by essentially controlling for all
potential confounders that diﬀerentiate local authorities. Nevertheless,
to examine the country level diﬀerences in crime among the local au-
thorities examined in this study in more detail we conduct a simple t-
test for diﬀerence of means on average violent and property crime rates.
As expected, and noted in international crime data, Scotland local au-
thorities have higher homicide rates than England and Wales local
authorities (see Soothill and Francis, 2012). The average homicide rate
among Scotland local authorities in this study is 2.04 per 100,000 while
the homicide rate among England and Wales is 0.98 per 100,000
(t=6.2, p < 0.01). In the case of property and violent crime, England
and Wales, both have higher reported levels of crime than Scotland in
the local authorities that we study. For instance, the average annual
property crime rates are 3185 per 100,000 residents in England and
Wales while they are 2078 per 100,000 residents in Scotland for the
local authorities we study (t=5.3, p < 0.01). Again, this is generally
accepted as an accurate representation of property crime data across
these countries (Scottish Crime and Justice Survey 2012–2013, 2014).
Finally, the average annual violent crime rates are 246 per 100,000 in
Scotland and 1268 per 100,000 in England and Wales (t=13.9,
p < 0.01). Unfortunately, there are no Scottish equivalents of the
England and Wales indicator of violence with and without injury. Thus,
Table 1
Summary of Relationships (Pearson's r) between Crime and Number of Wells in Local Authorities, 2004–2015.
Homicide Violence Violent Crime Property Crime
No. Local Authorities (%) No. Local Authorities (%) No. Local Authorities (%) No. Local Authorities (%)
Positive & Signiﬁcant 5 (7%) 6 (9%) 9 (9%) 24 (35%)
Positive & Insigniﬁcant 26 (38%) 33 (49%) 34 (49%) 11 (16%)
Negative & Signiﬁcant 3 (4%) 11 (16%) 17 (25%) 20 (29%)
Negative & Insigniﬁcant 34 (49%) 13 (19%) 13 (19%) 13 (19%)
Missing 1 (1%) 6 (9%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%)
100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 2
Fixed-Eﬀects Regression Coeﬃcients (b) and Robust Standard Errors (SE) for Variables Estimating UK Crime Rates, 2004–2015a.
Homicide Violence Violent Crime Property Crime
b SE b SE b SE b SE
No. Wells −0.042 0.035 .020* 0.0079 .015* 0.0072 0.0078 0.0079
Males 16–24 0.15 0.11 0.0037 0.0076 0.0036 0.0071 0.0056 0.0056
Population Density 0.26 0.22 0.021 0.034 −0.046 0.032 −0.10** 0.025
Job Density −0.34 1.4 0.029 0.14 0.018 0.13 0.021 0.086
Unemployment −0.021 0.057 −0.0085 0.0048 −0.0085 0.0045 −0.0026 0.0038
Income (1,000s) 0.062 0.075 −0.0056 0.0053 −0.0056 0.0049 −0.0023 0.0038
Year (vs. 2004) – – – – – – – –
2005 0.60 0.39 .10** 0.021 .084** 0.019 −0.035** 0.012
2006 −0.19 0.31 .092** 0.030 .071* 0.027 −0.05** 0.017
2007 0.20 0.40 −0.014 0.031 −0.025 0.029 −0.16** 0.020
2008 0.30 0.44 −0.071* 0.031 −0.081** 0.029 −0.23** 0.020
2009 0.26 0.48 −0.12* 0.045 −0.13** 0.044 −0.35** 0.036
2010 0.08 0.56 −0.14** 0.040 −0.15** 0.038 −0.46** 0.025
2011 −0.22 0.54 −0.21** 0.040 −0.19** 0.037 −0.51** 0.027
2012 −0.48 0.50 −0.25** 0.039 −0.25** 0.036 −0.62** 0.027
2013 −0.17 0.56 −0.23** 0.040 −0.21** 0.038 −0.65** 0.028
2014 −0.35 0.51 −0.11** 0.042 −0.09** 0.041 −0.66** 0.027
2015 0.19 0.52 .13** 0.045 .16** 0.042 −0.63** 0.028
Constant 0.24 2.1 7.2** 0.26 7.4 0.24 8.9 0.17
N 777 734 777 777
F 2.3* 29.5** 29.4** 92.6**
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.46 0.51 0.88
Note: **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05; 2-tailed.
a Crime rates are expressed in natural log (ln) units. Thus, we interpret the exponentiated regression coeﬃcients (b) as a percentage change in the crime rate corresponding to a 1-unit
change in the independent variable. For example, we expect to see about a 2% increase in violence within local authorities with each additional well (i.e., exp (.20)= 1.02).
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the analysis for the variable Violence is limited to England and Wales
local authorities (see Tables 1 and 2).
3.2. Independent variable
The Department of Energy and Climate Change recorded the es-
tablishment of at least one oil and gas well in 69 local authorities
between 2004 and 2015. Thus, the independent variable in this study
represents the number of existing oil and gas wells in a local authority
in any given year (No. Wells). These data are made available by the
Oil and Gas Authority through their Onshore Well Data File (http://
data-ogauthority.opendata.arcgis.com).The information contained in
that data ﬁle includes the location (latitude and longitude) of each oil
and gas wells and the date wells were permitted, spudded, began
operation and ended operation. We mapped the location of each well
within each local authority using GIS technology. This approach al-
lows researchers to produce a variable measuring the number of oil
and gas producing wells in each local authority in any given year. The
locations of the oil and gas wells examined in this study are displayed
in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Distribution of Spudded Oil and Gas Wells in England, Scotland and Wales, 2004–2015.
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As noted in Fig. 2, oil and gas wells are generally distributed within
the midlands and south of London as well as in rural parts of Scotland
and Wales. For the purposes of this study we mark the year a well was
‘spudded’ as the beginning of that portion of oil and gas development in
a local authority. A well is generally ‘spudded’ on the date that drilling
begins. Research suggests that the social consequences of oil and gas
development often emerge shortly after extractive industries begin
production (Freudenburg and Frickel, 1994). Thus, the spud date marks
an important point in the oil and gas development process. The spud
date is also typically used by researchers who study the economic im-
pact of oil and gas development (e.g., Muehlenbachs et al., 2015). Fi-
nally, as previously noted, if oil and gas development is correlated with
crime, then as the number of wells increase within a local authority, the
crime rate should also increase.
3.3. Control variables
Crime rates within local authorities are likely to be associated with
factors other than the number of oil and gas production wells. Thus, we
adjust the relationship between the number of oil and gas wells and
crime using several time variant control variables. The choice of con-
trols is based on prior research on development and crime. Speciﬁcally,
we study oil and gas development and crime within local authorities
while controlling for (1) the percentage of young males, (2) population
density, (3) job density, (4) household unemployment, (5) median
household income and (5) year. These variables were obtained using
the ‘query’ feature in the Oﬃce of National Statistics’ Nomis Database
(https://www.nomisweb.co.uk). We account for missing data among
the control variables using multiple imputation methods via the ‘mi’
command in version 15 of Stata (Carlin et al., 2003). As a result, Stata
imputed 100 additional datasets with random error terms to estimate
between 33 (for household income) and 63 (for young males) missing
values.
We measure the percentage of the population in each local authority
that is male and between the ages of 16 and 24 (Males 16–24). This
variable is used as a loose indicator of a relatively crime prone popu-
lation that may be more likely to engage in crime and drive up crime in
local authorities (Farrington, 1986). We hypothesise that as the per-
centage of these males increase within a local authority, crime in that
local authority is also likely to increase. Second, we control for popu-
lation density. Population density is measured as the number of people
per square kilometer (Population Density). We suggest that many times
oil and gas development tends to be situated in relatively remote and
locations where population density is low.
Criminologists have sometimes suggested that low density com-
munities may have lower crime rates than high density communities
because people are more likely to know one another (see Shichor et al.,
1979). Thus, density is important in studies of oil and gas development
and crime (see Wilkinson et al., 1984). Since we are measuring change
within local authorities, examining the variable Population Density is
essential as it reﬂects changes in heterogeneity that may occur in au-
thorities over time and may inﬂuence delinquent behavior
(Freudenburg, 1979).
We also create a variable Job Density that measures the number of
vacant jobs in a local authority relative to the number of people that are
classiﬁed by the government as able to work (see Nomis). This ratio is
greater than “1″ if there are more jobs than job seekers and less than “1″
if there are more job seekers than jobs. We hypothesise that increases in
the availability of jobs should lead to increases in the rates of crime
within local authorities over time. If oil and gas development increases
job availability though the creation of industry and service jobs, this
should help explain the relationship between oil and gas development
and crime. As an additional measure of employment status, we measure
household unemployment (Unemployment) that looks the percentage of
households where all or some of the members are unemployed.
Household unemployment measures the percentage of households
within a local authority where at least one householder is unemployed
but able to work. We examine the economic conditions within a local
authority by looking at median household income in thousands of
pounds (£) (Median Income). Local authorities where residents have
lower average incomes may be more open to oil and gas development
than local authorities that have higher incomes. Thus, other things
being equal, low income authorities may be more likely to attract oil
and gas development and, because of relatively low incomes, have
higher crime rates because these communities may be more socially
disorganised (see Bursik and Grasmick, 1993). Controlling for income
as a potential source of spuriousness is important in any study of oil and
gas development and crime. Finally, as we are conducting a ﬁxed eﬀects
analysis within local authorities we also control for time (Year). That is,
crime may be increasing or decreasing over time in a way that has
nothing to do with development or other control variables included in
the model (Wilkinson et al., 1984). By adjusting the models by Year as a
categorical variable we are able to capture any potential non-linear
trends in crime that could, if left unaccounted for, be attributed to oil
and gas development related crime.
4. Analysis
Unlike cross-sectional analyses that examine variation in crime be-
tween local authorities, we are interested in the potential correlation
between oil and gas development and crime within local authorities.
For this reason we use ﬁxed-eﬀects regression using ‘xtreg’ with the ‘fe’
option in Stata to hold constant any stable characteristics between local
authorities (Allison, 1994; Greene, 2012). This approach allows us to
establish if there is something unique about the impact of oil and gas
development within local authorities. The ﬁxed-eﬀects model can be
speciﬁed as follows when ‘i’ represents local authorities and ‘t’ re-
presents years:
Y(it)=X(it)Beta+ Alpha(i)+Mu(it); for i= 1–69 observed at
t= 2004–2015
Where Y(it) is the dependent variable ‘crime’, X(it) is a 1 by K matrix of
the number of spudded oil and gas wells and controls, Beta is a K-di-
mensional column vector of parameters, Alpha(i) represents all un-
observed time-invariant local authority variables that inﬂuence Y(it),
and Mu(it) is the error term.
Because crime has both increased and decreased in UK local au-
thorities between the years of 2004 and 2015 we have also, as noted,
included a control that measures for this trend (i.e., Year) in each model
we estimate. Despite our best eﬀorts to control for trends in these crime
data within local authorities, there may still be the potential for pro-
blematic serial correlation in the models. To test for this potential
violation we employ the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation. The
Wooldridge test uses the F-distribution to test the null hypothesis that
no autocorrelation exists in a model. In the models reported here we
ﬁnd no evidence of autocorrelation and the therefore conclude that the
ﬁxed eﬀects standard errors we estimate do not suﬀer from problematic
autocorrelation (Drukker, 2003). We also compute robust standard er-
rors for each model estimated to account for the clustering of ob-
servations within local authorities and produce more eﬃcient estimates
that minimize heteroscedasticity.
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Prior to presenting the results for the ﬁxed eﬀects panel regression
analysis, we present simple bivariate correlations between homicide,
violence, violent crime, property crime and the number of wells for
each local authority. These bivariate correlations are important because
they set the stage for the multivariate analysis and demonstrate initial
patterns of relationships between crime and oil and gas development
within each local authority. This approach shows that the relationship
is tenuous as sometimes the correlations are positive and sometimes
negative. Given there are only twelve years of data in each local au-
thority (n= 12) it is not surprising that many of the relationships are
not statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 1 displays results for Pearson’s r correlations between each
type of crime and the number of wells within each local authority be-
tween 2004 and 2015. As Table 1 illustrates, the bivariate relationship
between crime and oil and gas development across England, Wales and
Scotland is complex. In some local authorities, the correlations are
positive, suggesting that development could increase crime. In other
local authorities, the correlations are negative, suggesting that devel-
opment may reduce crime.
Importantly, when examining Table 1, the correlations that are
positive and signiﬁcant outnumber those that are negative and sig-
niﬁcant in the case of property crime only. Nevertheless, the number of
local authorities where increases in the oil and gas development are
associated with increases in crime tend to outnumber those where oil
and gas development is associated with decreases in crime (i.e., vio-
lence, violent crime and property crime). In short, Table 1 shows the
complexity of the association and does not suggest any deﬁnitive an-
swer to the question of whether oil and gas development increases
crime. For this reason, it is important to examine that relationship
considering other important variables that may inﬂuence crime within
local authorities to help provide a more deﬁnitive explanation about
the potential relationship between oil and gas development and crime.
Table 2 provides a more complex analysis though the multivariate
ﬁxed eﬀects results that test the relationship between oil and gas de-
velopment and crime when controlling for the percentage of young
males, population density, percentage of unemployed households,
median household income, job density and time.
The results in Table 2 are largely repetitive of the trends in the bi-
variate results reported in Table 1. However, there are some major
diﬀerences in the two sets of ﬁndings. First there is a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant correlation between the number of oil and gas
wells violence and violent crime rates. More speciﬁcally, the coeﬃ-
cients in Table 2 suggests that an each additional oil and gas well in a
local authority is associated with a 2 percent increase in violence within
local authorities between 2004 and 2015 (p < 0.05). It is important to
note that our measure of violence includes assaults, harassment and
vehicle oﬀences that cause injury. Thus, this ﬁnding is not necessarily
surprising as other studies suggest that traﬃc crime and ‘pub brawls’
are especially problematic in areas where oil and gas is rapidly devel-
oping (Carrington et al., 2010; Price et al., 2014; Scott et al., 2012;
Ruddell, 2011). In the case of violent crime rates (Table 2), the results
are also statistically signiﬁcant and suggest that each additional oil and
gas well is associated with a 1.5 percent increase violent crime
(p < 0.05). Again, these results are consistent with US-based studies
that ﬁnd that violent crime is positively associated with oil and gas
development (Komarek, 2015). As noted by the coeﬃcients in Table 2,
the substantive impact of these increases, while consistent with other
similar studies, are still rather small. Nevertheless, when multiple wells
are established, increases in crime could become quite large. In the
context of Fig. 1, however, the growth in new wells across the UK is
rather modest and very few local authorities experienced an extensive
proliferation of development during the time-period under
investigation. In particular, there were never more than 59 oil and gas
wells operating at one time in any one local authority between the years
between 2004 and 2015. Thus, increases in crime due to this devel-
opment are likely incremental and reﬂect modest growth in oil and gas
development as opposed to more rapid boomtown growth.
The results in Table 2 are also important as they suggest that there is
no empirical evidence that oil and gas development is correlated with
homicide rates or property crime rates within UK authorities. This si-
tuation is not necessarily surprising given past research ﬁndings (e.g.,
Covey and Menard, 1983; Komarek, 2015) but it is important to high-
light this ﬁnding as the lack of statistical signiﬁcance suggests that oil
and gas development may not inﬂuence all types of crime.
Finally, in the case of the crime models presented in Table 2 it is
certainly the case that Year is the best predictor of crime. Importantly,
except for homicide, crime appears to increase in 2005 and 2006 (when
compared to 2004) and then decreases between 2007 and 2014. There
is a slight increase in violence and violent crime in 2015 (when com-
pared to 2004). This ﬁnding documenting a rather sustained drop in
violent and property crime is consistent with national trends lending
credibility to these ﬁndings.
5. Discussion & conclusions
The Economic Aﬀairs Committee (EAC) report to the House of Lords
recently asked if oil and gas development ‘fears that have been raised of
serious adverse consequences for the health and for the environment,
locally and nationally, have substance?’ (EAC, 2014). Notably missing
from the report’s call for investigation are the potential social impacts
of oil and gas extraction. Crime is one important social impact that has
yet to be considered in the policy to expand oil and gas extraction
across the UK. Our research has drawn upon criminological tradition
and its emphasis on the concept of social disorganisation to focus on the
neglected issue of crime in local authorities where oil and gas devel-
opment is occurring. We ﬁnd that the number of oil and gas extraction
wells are positively correlated with violent crime rates in England and
Scotland between the years of 2004 and 2015 within 69 local autho-
rities that contain at least one spudded well. In particular, each addi-
tional spudded well corresponds to a 1.5 percent increase in violent
crime. Thus, there is potential for oil and gas development to increase
violent crime.
We situate our ﬁndings regarding oil and gas development, social
disorganisation and crime within the political economy of crime and
environmental justice. In particular, researchers such as Stretesky
et al. (2013, Ch.5) have proposed that the extraction of natural re-
sources (especially coal, natural gas and oil) is not only connected to
social disorganisation, but social inequality as well. Moreover, re-
searchers such as Foster et al., 2011 suggest that natural resource
extraction is critical to the maintenance of capitalism. This is the case
because capitalism requires endless growth and wealth accumulation
that demand accelerated natural resource extraction (Foster et al.,
2011; Klein, 2015). This growth imperative is at odds with environ-
mental sustainability and social justice. That is, increasing levels of
extraction create additional environmental degradation and intensify
environmental injustice (Gould et al., 2008). In particular, environ-
mental justice ideals are met when all people are (1) included equally
in environmental decision-making (2) share environmental beneﬁts
and (3) are protected from the unequal and negative impacts of en-
vironmental hazards (Bullard and Johnson, 2000). As the geographic
distribution of oil and gas development in the UK might suggest, this
is not occurring. First, oil and gas reserves are not equally distributed
across the UK landscape. This is an important issue because oil and
gas reserves can be viewed as a ‘curse’ (Sachs and Warner, 2001).
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When it comes to crime, this approach is highlighted by the treadmill
of crime perspective developed by Stretesky et al. (2013). More re-
cently the relationship between crime, social disorganisation and
inequality has been expanded upon by Lynch and Boggess (2016); see
also Lynch and Michalowski, 2006). In particular, Lynch and Boggess
(2016) suggest that when social disorganisation is interpreted within
the context of the needs of capitalism, it may help explain the dis-
tribution of crime, poverty and inequality. When it comes to the de-
velopment of oil and gas wells across the UK, our interpretation of
social disorganization is similar to the views of Lynch and Boggess. In
the present analysis we suggest that the distribution of social dis-
organization may be encouraged by oil and gas development and
potentially contribute to crime. As a result, communities that mine oil
and gas are more likely to suﬀer from the consequences of that re-
source development. Second, the wealthiest communities may be
better able than the poorest communities to resist oil and gas devel-
opment and the social disorganisation that accompanies that devel-
opment (Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003). In the UK, oil and gas develop-
ment is often contested and it is not unusual for communities to
oppose the construction of wells (see Jones et al., 2015). Wealthy
communities can translate their wealth into a power of resistance for
the common good and are more likely to eﬀectively oppose oil and
gas development (Gould et al., 1996). As a result, the spatial dis-
tribution of extraction is unevenly distributed across the landscape,
constrained by its physical location and the socio-economic power of
communities. The treadmill of crime interpretation of oil and gas
development has yet to be empirically tested. That is, we study re-
lationship between wells and crime within and not between local
authorities in order to tease out the potential causal relationships
between the oil and gas development and crime. However, future
environmental justice research could be designed to examine com-
munity power dynamics to better understand the implications and
distribution of oil and gas development when it comes to social dis-
organisation and violence (Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003).
Notably, and consistent with the US studies, our ﬁndings con-
cerning the relationship between oil and gas development do not
suggest oil and gas development are related to homicide or property
crime rates (Covey and Menard 1983; Komarek, 2015; James and
Smith, 2017). Thus, all types of crime do not appear to be inﬂuenced
oil and gas development. Importantly, while our ﬁndings concerning
the lack of a relationship between oil and gas development and
property crime are consistent with previous research, they are also a
bit puzzling. What could explain these mixed results concerning
violent crime, homicide and property crime? There are three poten-
tial answers to this question. First, previous US research and the de-
ﬁnition of crime may help answer this question. That is, violence rates
in this study include traﬃc related crimes and pub brawling events. In
the US, researchers have noted that it is precisely these types of
events that are the most likely to be related to oil and gas (and
especially boomtown) development. For instance, Ruddell and Ortiz
(2014) notes that residents and police suggested that aggressive,
impaired or dangerous driving was especially problematic. Other
qualitative studies in the UK also report similar types of observations
(Carrington et al., 2010; Smith and Christou, 2009). Second, it could
also be the case that there is simply not enough oil and gas well de-
velopment to impact property crime and homicide. Third, it could be
that we have not adequately captured the impact of oil and gas de-
velopment within local authorities. To examine support for the
second and third explanations we conducted two additional post-hoc
analyses (shown in Appendix C). First, we divided our sample based
on expanding and contracting oil and gas development within local
authorities. Next, we estimated the impact of the number of oil and
gas wells in each sample (expanding local authorities and contracting
local authorities) to see if the correlations between wells and crime
changed. Our results suggest some support for the proposition that
crime is only a problem in local authorities that are expanding pro-
duction (i.e., boomtowns). In fact, within the expanding authorities
each additional well is associated with a 4.9 percent increase violent
crime. Moreover, the number of wells spudded is now also statisti-
cally signiﬁcant in the property crime rate models we estimate (Ap-
pendix C). In particular, each additional spudded well is also asso-
ciated with a 4.9 percent increase in property crime within those local
authorities that build more wells. The coeﬃcient for murder remains
statistically insigniﬁcant. In short, while there were only 9 local au-
thorities where spudded wells outpaced well closures between 2004
and 2015, these authorities produce the strongest correlations be-
tween the number of wells and property and violent crime (see
Appendix C).
Second, we examine the potential that Table 2 results for property
crime and homicide may be the result of using the number of wells as
an indicator of oil and gas development. As an alternative oil and gas
development indicator we also gathered data on employment from
the UK’s Oﬃce of National Statistics (https://www.ons.gov.uk) for
the employment category “process, plant and machine operatives”
(Major Group 8). While this measure of oil and gas development is far
from perfect, it does include the number of employees working in
energy extraction occupations and therefore oﬀers an alternative in-
dicator to the number of wells. We include this employment indicator
as an additional predictor variable in the models we estimate in
Table 2.1 These post-hoc results in Appendix C provide little evidence
that poverty and homicide are insigniﬁcant because of the way we
operationalise oil and gas development. That is, employment is in-
signiﬁcant in the Models in Appendix C and the coeﬃcients for oil
and gas remain similar to those presented in Table 2. Unfortunately,
the crude measure of oil and gas employment (though the only one
available over time at the local authority level) is not likely a suﬃ-
cient test of this alternative explanation for our lack of statistically
signiﬁcant ﬁndings. However, when possible future studies should
attempt to include alternative measures of oil and gas development to
measure diﬀerent dimensions of development. For instance, the size
of an oilﬁeld or more direct measure of oil and gas employment may
produce diﬀerent and more robust ﬁndings.
In the end, there are no studies, of which we are aware, that have
examined the empirical relationship between oil and gas development
and crime within UK local authorities. However, given the potential
social consequences facing oil and gas communities such an investiga-
tion is warranted. We recommend that as the UK’s demand for energy
continues to rise that criminologists should explore if, and how, forms
of energy development might produce conditions within communities
that can lead to an increase in crime. As we have shown, answering that
question will provide important insight into the social consequences of
oil and gas development, including a better understanding of environ-
mental injustice in the UK.
1 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out an alternative for
measuring oil and gas development that may be more compatible with social dis-
organisation theory.
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Appendix A
Table A1
Appendix B
Table B1
Appendix C
Tables C1 and C2
Table B1
Descriptive Statistics: Bivariate Correlations, Minimum, Maximum, Mean and Standard Deviation.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(1) Homicide 1.000
(2) Violence 0.751* 1.000
(3) Violent Crime 0.168* 0.993* 1.000
(4) Property Crime 0.276* 0.302* 0.755* 1.000
(5) No. Wells −0.024 −0.053 −0.084* −0.040 1.000
(6) Males 16 to 24 0.061 0.265* 0.329* 0.249* −0.070 1.000
(7) Population Density 0.222* 0.468* 0.525* 0.476* −0.032 0.469* 1.000
(8) Job Density −0.033 0.008 0.090* −0.059 0.043 0.090* 0.015 1.000
(9) Unemployment 0.091* 0.142* 0.132* 0.116* −0.030 0.339* 0.402* −0.285* 1.000
(10) Median Income −0.182 −0.393* −0.314* −0.510* −0.112* −0.091* −0.133* 0.313* −0.209* 1.000
(11) Year −0.067 −0.153* −0.153* −0.566* −0.036 0.143* 0.014 0.039 0.334* 0.449* 1.000
Minimum 0 170.8 114.61 548.3 0.00 2.81 0.08 0.46 1.1 13050 2004
Maximum 11.36 2990.3 3491.30 11677.3 59.00 10.56 42.75 1.26 15.0 31217 2015
Mean 1.05 1125.6 1203.36 3114.6 2.31 5.68 5.68 0.76 6.1 19864 2010
Standard Deviation 1.18 449.5 561.33 1448.6 5.48 1.17 6.94 0.15 2.7 2998 3.74
*p < 0.05.
Table C1
Post-Hoc Fixed-Eﬀects Regression Coeﬃcients (b) and Robust Standard Errors (SE) for Number of Oil and Gas Wells on Crime Rates, by Local Authorities that are (1) Expanding and (2)
Contracting Oil and Gas Development (2004–2015) [a].
Homicide Violence Violent Crime Property Crime
b SE b SE b SE b SE
No. Wells (Expanding Authorities), 0.017 0.069 .047** 0.012 .049** 0.012 .049* 0.009
N (9 Authorities) 89 89 89 89
F 3.22** 46.67** 51.87** 117.6**
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.47 0.51 0.95
No. Wells (Contracting Authorities) −0.031 0.046 .012* 0.0049 .0081* 0.0040 −0.00021 0.0032
N (55–60 Authorities) 626 587 626 626
F 1.76* 21.58** 24.31** 97.97**
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.44 0.48 0.88
Note: **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, #p < 0.10 signiﬁcance (two-tailed).
[a] Coeﬃcients are adjusted for Males 16–24, Population Density, Job Density, Unemployment, Income and Year (b and SE not shown).
Table A1
Local Authorities Included in the Study (2004–2015).
Allerdale Falkirk North East Lincolnshire Sevenoaks
Barnsley Fife North Kesteven St. Helens
Basingstoke and Deane Flintshire North Lincolnshire Staﬀordshire
Moorlands
Bridgend Fylde North Warwickshire Stoke-on-Trent
Caerphilly Guildford Northumberland Sunderland
Carlisle Hambleton Nottingham Swansea
Charnwood Highland Preston Tandridge
Cheshire West and Chester Horsham Purbeck Test Valley
Chichester Isle of Wight Redcar and Cleveland Tunbridge Wells
Clackmannanshire Knowsley Reigate and Banstead Wakeﬁeld
Denbighshire Lichﬁeld Rhondda Cynon Taf Warrington
Derbyshire Dales Melton Rotherham West Dorset
Doncaster Merthyr Tydﬁl Ryedale West Lancashire
Dumfries and Galloway Mid Sussex Salford West Lindsey
East Hampshire Mole Valley Scarborough Wigan
East Lindsey Neath Port Talbot Sefton Winchester
East Riding of Yorkshire Newcastle-under-Lyme Selby Wrexham
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Post-Hoc Fixed-Eﬀects Regression Coeﬃcients (b) and Robust Standard Errors (SE) for Process, Plant and Machine Operatives Employment on Crime Rates, 2004 to 2015 [a].
Homicide Violence Violent Crime Property Crime
b SE b SE b SE b SE
No. Wells −0.057 0.034 .020* 0.0085 .016* 0.0077 0.0082 0.0084
Process, Plant & Machine Employment 0.0058 0.0072 0.0012 0.0065 0.00041 0.0060 −0.0024 0.0042
N 745 709 745 745
F 2.07** 26.1** 25.85** 89.79**
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.46 0.51 0.88
Note: **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, two-tailed.
[a] Coeﬃcients are adjusted for Males 16–24, Population Density, Job Density, Unemployment, Income and Year (b and SE not shown).
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